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Considered one of the most powerful storms in history, Typhoon Haiyan (in the Philippines called 
Yolanda) caused 6,300 casualties and affected 1.4 million families in the Philippines (Gov. of the 
Philippines, 2016).  More than 4.4 million people were displaced, and more than 1 million houses 
were destroyed (NEDA, 2013). The economic damage was estimated at $12.9 billion (NEDA, 2013). 
Among the affected regions, three municipalities of Tacloban, Palo, and Tanauan, in Leyte were hit 
the hardest. 
Since a month after the typhoon in December 2013, members of IRIDeS have continued to investigate 
and conduct research in Leyte to deepen understanding on disaster damage, emergency response, and 
rebuilding. In this third report, updates and findings on the recovery progress, warning and evacuation, 
and recovery in the education sector of Leyte two years after Haiyan are reported. In addition, 
grounded activities on disaster education and a collaborative workshop held with a local government 
are described. During this 2015 academic year, 3 teams of: 1) regional and community rebuilding; 2) 
evacuation and warning; and 3) disaster education; were created to research and share practical 
knowledge on the ground. 
The regional and community rebuilding group reports on the overall post-Haiyan recovery progress 
up to March 2016, with an emphasis on the resettlement status in Tacloban City. In addition to 
articulating relocation patterns of the coastal communities, the group investigated challenges that 
relocating communities are facing: stagnant infrastructure for living; lack of income generation 
opportunity; increased expenditures to sustain lives; split and double households; and overall 
stagnancy of relocation. The evacuation and warning group reports on the preliminary study on 
community leaders in evacuation, by using four questions related to intention and behavior of 
evacuation as well as relationships with the barangay captains. The result suggests that residents do 
not necessarily evacuate even if they trust barangay captains, however, those who evacuated have 
high levels of trust to the barangay captains. Finally, the disaster education group explores linkage 
between housing and education in the post-disaster phase, and reports on the current learning 
environment in schools and children’s access to education in relocation. One of the pressing needs is 
schools for children in the relocating families. One of the difficulties on this issue is that development 
in new targeted relocation sites needs coordination between departments that usually manage projects 
independently without much collaboration.  
Sharing state-of-the-art knowledge to better manage future disasters is also important. Information on 
an IRIDeS/Tacloban City workshop, as well as a disaster education training handbook developed and 
shared with Tacloban City 6th graders, are also included for the use of recovering communities and 
other communities facing disaster threats to protect themselves for minimizing future disaster impacts. 
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Tropical Storm Haiyan (in the Philippines called Yolanda) formed east of the Philippines in 
Micronesia, and after gaining strength, moved west, entering the Philippines Area of Responsibility 
(PAR) as a Typhoon on November 6, 2013 (NDRRMC, 2013 and Relief Web, 2013). Typhoon 
Haiyan continued west and intensified, and first made landfall at 4:40 am on November 8, 2013 over 
Guiuan, Eastern Samar, as a Category 5 typhoon with a wind speed of over 125 knots (NDRRMC). 
From 7am until 8pm on November 8th, Typhoon Haiyan made landfall 5 more times, in Letye, Cebu, 
Iloilo, and finally Palawan, before finally weakening and passing out of the PAR on November 9th 
(NDRRMC).  
Affecting several countries in Southeast Asia, the massive damage caused by Typhoon Haiyan made 
it the most devastating disaster in the Asia Pacific in 2013 (OCHA) and the high wind speed, storm 
surge and large waves of Typhoon Haiyan caused the largest damage to the Philippines.  Considered 
one of the most powerful storms in history, Haiyan caused 6,300 casualties and affected 1.4 million 
families in the Philippines (Gov. of the Philippines, 2016). More than 4.4 million people were 
displaced and more than 1 million houses were destroyed (NEDA, 2013). The economic damage was 
estimated at $12.9 billion, and in December 2013, Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) 
estimated the needed budget for recovery at $8.2 billion (NEDA, 2013).  
More than 80 percent of the people who lost their lives in Haiyan were from the three municipalities 
of Tacloban, Palo, and Tanauan, in Leyte (NEDA, 2013); 2,603 people lost their lives in Tacloban 
City alone. The Eastern Visayas (Region VIII) suffered the greatest damage, with 26% of affected 
people, and 44% of all damaged houses (Tacloban City, 2014). Tacloban City, the regional hub of 
Region VIII, had the largest damage to housing and settlements of any city/municipality in the 
Philippines, with more than 28,700 totally damaged houses and 17,600 partially damaged houses 
(Tacloban City, 2014). Of the houses damaged by Haiyan in Tacloban, 90% were in the low-laying 
coastal areas (Tacloban City, 2014). The affected communities were primarily informal settlers, and 
approximately 10,000 of the houses that were damaged in Haiyan were those of the urban poor 
(Tacloban City, 2014). 
1.2.	About	IRIDeS	Typhoon	Haiyan	Research		
A month after Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) caused devastation in the Eastern Visayas and part 
of Central Visayas in the Philippines, the first batch of researchers from the International Research 
Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS) of Tohoku University in Sendai, Japan reached Leyte in 
December 2013, to conduct damage assessment with local counterparts. Since then, members of 
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IRIDeS have continued to investigate and conduct research in Leyte to deepen understanding on 
disaster damage, emergency response, and rebuilding. Intentions for continued research include 
sharing updated knowledge on disaster management to better manage future disasters so that 
recovering communities as well as other communities facing disaster threats could protect themselves 
and minimize future disaster impacts.  
During the first two academic years, 4 teams including: 1) hazard and damage evaluation team; 2) 
warning and evacuation assessment team; 3) disaster medical science team; and 4) disaster recovery 
team; surveyed the typhoon affected areas under the name “IRIDeS fact-finding mission.” Their 
activities and findings are available in the Initial Report of IRIDeS Fact-finding mission to Philippines 
(May 2014) and the Second Report of IRIDeS Fact-finding mission to Philippines (March 2015). 
Now in the 3rd year, this research project is a continuation of IRIDeS’s preceding two years’ research, 
building on past findings and relationships. This third report, “Typhoon Haiyan: Report on the 
ongoing process of building back better,” provides updates and findings on the recovery progress, 
warning and evacuation, and recovery in the education sector of Leyte two years after Haiyan. In 
addition, it reports on grounded activities on disaster education and a collaborative workshop held 
with a local government (for details, please see Sections 5 and 6 and Appendix 1 and 2). During this 
2015 academic year, 3 teams of: 1) regional and community rebuilding; 2) disaster education; and 3) 
evacuation and warning; were created to research and share practical knowledge on the ground.  
Those who were involved in activities during this academic year include: Dr. S. Kure (Hazard and 
Risk Evaluation Research Division); Dr. K. Iuchi, and Dr. E.A. Maly (Human and Social Response 
Research Division); Dr. Y. Ono, Dr. A. Sakurai, Dr. T. Izumi, Dr. Y. Jibiki, and Mr. T. Ito (Disaster 
Information Management and Public Collaboration Division). 
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This section reports on the overall post-Haiyan recovery progress up to March 2016, with an emphasis 
on the resettlement status in Tacloban City, located in Region VIII. Information was gathered mainly 
from interviews (focus group and individual), various conversations with government officials and 
residents, as well as official documents obtained from websites and governmental offices. Areas of 
activities include Manila for interviews with national government officials, Tacloban City and 
surrounding areas (e.g. Palo and Tanauan) for interviews with regional and local governments, and a 
focus on five coastal barangays in Tacloban (68, 31, 56-A, 61, 88) for barangay leaders and residents.  
2.2	Institutional	set	up	for	Haiyan	recovery	
Various planning and decisions have been made to proceed with recovery since Typhoon Haiyan in 
2013. Following are the key decisions and actions leading Haiyan recovery, including institutional 
mandates. 
2013 
December 6 Then president Beningo S. Aquino III appoints a presidential assistant for 
rehabilitation and recovery to manage and coordinate overall reconstruction 
efforts (Memorandum Order No. 62, s. 2013) (President of the Philippines, 2013) 
December 16 President Aquino approves “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build 
Back Better (RAY)” by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). 
RAY explains basic principles and needed funding for reconstruction, as well as 
the role of the Presidential Assistance on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
(PARR) (National Economic and Development Authority, 2013). 
2014 
Early January  PARR begins operating. One of the important responsibilities of PARR was the 
inter-coordination of national departments as well as interactions between national 
and local government units (LGUs) for developing a comprehensive rehabilitation 
and recovery plan (CRRP). 
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August 1 PARR submits CRRP to the president for approval. This plan was a 8,000 
page 8 volume plan, with a cost of P170.9 billion for 171 municipalities disrupted 
by the typhoon (OPARR, 2014).  
October 29 President Aquino approves the CRRP. With this approval, the plan will be 
carried out in five main clusters, including infrastructure (lead: Department of 
Public Works and Highways (DPWH)), social services (lead: Department of 
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)), resettlement (lead: National Housing 
Authority (NHA)), livelihood (lead: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)) and 
support cluster (lead: NEDA and Department of Budget and Management (DBM) 
(GFDRR, 2015; OPARR, 2014). 
2015 
April 22 PARR functions transfer to NEDA. As conditions [of affected areas] begin to 
normalize, the functions of PARR can now be subsumed under the regular 
functions of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 
(NDRRMC) and other relevant agencies under Republic Act (RA) No. 10121, or 
the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of 2010 
(Memorandum Order No. 79, s. 2015)”. NEDA is appointed as the lead agency for 
reconstruction and recovery with the RA No. 10121. 
Each typhoon affected region had a coordinating body led by regional PARR and regional national 
departments. Regional PARR had a mandate to monitor and identify issues so that CRRP will be 
implemented with appropriate funding allocations.  
2.3	Housing	relocation	to	“build	back	better”	in	Tacloban	City	
Resettlement	scheme	in	Tacloban	City,	Region	VIII	
Four months after Haiyan, Tacloban City in Region VIII adopted a “no build ordinance,” with the 
stated goal of preventing future repetition of massive destruction to coastal communities (Ordinance 
No. 2013-12-15A) (Tacloban City, 2013). During this time the national government was debating the 
implementation of a 40-meter no build zone. To communicate the boundary of the no build zone to 
residents, permanent markers were installed 40 meters from the coast in Tacloban City’s coastal 
barangays.  
Along with the implementation of a coastal no build zone, a main focus of Tacloban City’s recovery 
plan was the relocation of coastal residents to new housing developments in the northern part of the 
city (the north) (Figure 2.1).  Even before Haiyan, Tacloban City had planned, to a smaller extent, for 
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development of this northern area as a new center for economic development, and had already 
acquired some land parcels that were used for housing reconstruction.  
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Tacloban City showing the location of temporary and permanent housing  
Tacloban City’s Office of Housing and Community Development became the coordinator for a 
complex process of providing different kinds of temporary and permanent housing, including varied 
and multiple actors, over multiple phases of housing recovery. They were also responsible for 
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coordinating with regional PARR and national departments to proceed with the plan and programs 
that developed. The City’s primary housing recovery scheme is a two-step relocation process; after 
staying in evacuation centers, residents move into temporary housing, and then later into new 
permanent housing.   
The two main types of temporary housing are: 1) barracks-style wooden “bunkhouses” built by the 
national government on several sites near the city center, or 2) “transitional shelters”, primarily 
bamboo structures built by donor agencies/organizations on sites in Tacloban North. People who had 
evacuated to the larger city-designated evacuation centers and those considered to be more socially 
vulnerable were prioritized for the bunkhouses, which accommodated over 1,000 families in three 
sites. In addition to these two main types of temporary housing, support was also provided by NGOs 
and donors for temporary rental assistance and shelter materials for housing repair, and many 
residents rebuilt their own housing using a combination of provided, purchased, and recycled building 
materials.        
The City considered the process of transition for evacuees, with the idea that the relocation process 
would be smoother for residents’ in terms of adjusting to new ways of living, by moving into 
transitional housing in the northern part of Tacloban and then into permanent housing in the same 
areas nearby.  As of early 2016, the National Housing Authority (NHA) is constructing the majority 
of permanent housing, with over 13,000 housing units planned for multiple sites in the north. Other 
donor agencies and NGOs are constructing 1,600 units of planned permanent housing in North 
Tacloban on city-owned land. In addition, there are other non-profit organizations planning for new 
resettlement sites independent from the City’s support, closer to the city center (see Iuchi & Maly, 
Forthcoming). Table 2.1 shows housing types used during temporary and permanent phases, including 
information about their respective locations, land tenure and ownership, as well as funding sources.  
Table 2.1 Housing types and details by temporary and permanent phases 



























































Two years after Haiyan, 1,600 families were still living in various temporary housing provided by 
government or NGOs, and 500 families had moved into the first permanent housing units in Tacloban 
North (Iuchi & Maly, Forthcoming). These included houses built by NGOs and donors as well as 
houses in the first completed NHA resettlement sites. Residents have and continue to experience 
varied paths and processes in housing recovery, as shown in Figure 2.2, as they wait to find out what 
permanent housing may become available for them. 
 




















































There are few precedents for housing relocation projects of the scale and complexity of that which is   
currently underway in Tacloban City. Although the coordinators of this resettlement planning and 
implementation are making intense efforts to integrate the various agencies and organizations 
involved, there are several issues that have emerged.  
2.5.1	Stagnant	infrastructure	provision	for	living	
Providing water to the new settlements in the northern part of Tacloban has proved to be an ongoing 
challenge. As an interim solution, water is being delivered by trucks with support from various donors. 
However, residents struggle with a limited supply of water, which was an often-reported reason for 
people to stay in or return to former communities. Similarly, electricity provision has been delayed. 
Until the provision of water and electricity are secured, the transfers of additional residents to housing 
in the northern part of Tacloban are on hold. 
2.5.2	Lack	of	income	generation	opportunities		
Some residents have created businesses in the new resettlement sites, such as sari sari (small scale 
convenience) stores, water selling, or pedi-cab (tricycle) or motorcycle driving. However, many 
residents are facing difficulties to find jobs in the northern part of Tacloban. Although various donors 
provided job training programs for those relocating, not much could be applied as there are minimal 
jobs available for new skillsets gained.  
2.5.3	Increased	expenditures	to	sustain	lives	
Since jobs that generate income are minimally available in the northern part of the city, many people 
have been making efforts to keep their original work. This is also the case for those who worked 
along the coast near downtown pre-Haiyan, in particular fisherfolks and fish vendors. For them, the 
distance from their new resettlement sites to former areas of livelihood activities is making them 
spend more. A large portion of their expenditures is for transportation for commuting back to their 
original areas.  
2.5.4	Split	and	double	households	
Related to the lack of livelihood opportunities in the north, many families chose to stay in the former 
coastal areas even after they have received a permanent house in Tacloban North. In some cases, 
households are separated into those who are staying in the north and those who stay in former areas, 
or in some cases, most of the family stays in the new house while the breadwinners (especially 




As a result of the suspension of additional transfers of more residents to the north because of the lack 
of access to water, the process of resettlement has stopped for the time being. In this context, residents 
who remain in coastal areas, included as eventual beneficiaries of permanent housing, are facing 
uncertainty about their future. 
To proceed with more realistic development for living in the north, Tacloban City is near to 
completion of the Tacloban North Integrated Development Plan, which suggests needed utilities and 
services for relocating communities in the short and long term. Development so far had been based on 
the national reconstruction scheme, and this Tacloban North Development Plan aims to fill the gap of 
national programs with local needs. The discussion is underway on which infrastructure to be 
primarily installed (e.g. water supply, electricity and sewage management), what other urban services 
are needed (e.g. schools and health care) and how livelihood and job opportunities are to be 
supported. Efforts to bring this program together have been effective to understand the holistic 
progress of development at the local level, and the role of each department and agency to proceed 
with better rebuilding. It also had a role to acknowledge to national governments how relocation is not 
only housing construction and infrastructure development, but also about returning living patterns to 
normalcy. 	
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The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR) describes roles and tasks of 
community leaders. In SFDRR’s Priorities for Action, and specifically in Priority 2 “Strengthening 
disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk”, national and local levels “[a]ssign, as appropriate, 
clear roles and tasks to community representatives within disaster risk management institutions and 
processes and decision-making through relevant legal frameworks.” (Para 27.(f), UNISDR). The 
SFDRR is an outcome document of the United Nations World Conference for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, and its description is abstract rather than practical and technical.  
Previous work regarding EWS (Early Warning Systems) mentioned the role of community 
leaders. Among the numerous extant studies regarding EWS, Sorensen and Sorensen (2007) and 
Mileti and Sorensen (1990) can be considered the most comprehensive to date. Sorensen and 
Sorensen (2007: 191) mentioned source credibility as one of the major factor for evacuation, and 
Mileti and Sorensen (1990: 2-9) indicated community opinion leaders as the source.  
In the context of Typhoon Haiyan, Kure et al. (2016a: 1156) stated that the warning transfer system at 
the local barangay level requires improvement, and the capabilities and performance of barangay 
captains played important roles in ensuring appropriate evacuation of the barangay residents. Also, 
Kure et al. (2016a: 1156) emphasized that the warning transfer system should be designed so that the 
warnings can be delivered directly to local residents by the barangay captains or officials. Many 
people claimed that if they had received the evacuation order directly from the barangay captain, they 
would have evacuated. Furthermore, Kure et al. (2016b: 1640008-24) observed that barangay captains’ 
knowledge and leadership may reduce casualties in future typhoon events based on their questionnaire 
survey conducted in this study. 
In summary, roles of community leaders in evacuation can be considered as very significant. Thus, in 
this report, we preliminarily and partially study roles of community leaders in evacuation. The term 
“community leaders” has a large variety of definitions and aspects (administrative, religious, informal 







Data for analysis in this chapter is based on a questionnaire survey which was implemented as part of 
the IRIDeS Fact Finding Mission. The survey was conducted from March 14 to March 22, 2014, 
using questionnaires completed by and interviews with respondents. The geographic area targeted by 
the survey included four barangays in Tacloban City, three barangays in Palo Municipality, and three 
barangays in Tanauan Municipality. All the targeted barangays are located on Leyte Island, and they 
share the same coastline along Leyte Bay. These barangays are geographically close to one another 
and were exposed to similar hazard levels. We intended to survey 200 respondents in each of the three 
locations: Tacloban City, Palo Municipality, and Tanauan Municipality. The demographic 
characteristics of survey respondents were consistent with those of the population of the Philippines. 
Ultimately, the survey included 642 respondents. 
3.2.2	Variables	for	analysis	
In the present chapter, the authors specify 4 questions for analysis from the questionnaire survey.  
1. Evacuation intention: Did you intend to evacuate to somewhere else except your 
house? 
2. Evacuation behavior: Where did you evacuate? 
3. Evacuees who were told to do so by barangay captains: Why did you decide to 
evacuate to somewhere other than your house? (In this question, not all respondents 
answered. Those who answered “yes” in evacuation behavior responded to this 
question.) 
4. How barangay captains were trusted: How much did you rely on Barangay leaders in 
order to get disaster related information such as typhoon warning? (In this question, the 
respondents selected one option from the following options: 1. Very high 2. High 3. 
Average 4. Low 5. Very low.)  
3.3	Results	
The analysis has two steps. The first step focuses on the barangay level and compares simple 
tabulation results of the targeted ten barangays. In the second step, the unit of analysis is individual 
respondents and it statistically examines the relationship between four variables which are generated 
by the four questions mentioned in section 3.2.2. 
 14 
3.3.1	Barangay-level	analysis  
The barangay level analysis does not present clear relationships between the four variables. The result 
of Barangay 1 and 4 indicates that evacuation intention and evacuation rates are high, but these two 
variables seem to have a weak relationship with the factors on barangay captains (see Table 1 below). 
To the contrary, Barangay Santa Cruz in Tanauan has higher evacuation intention and evacuation rate 
and these two variables may have relationships with the barangay captain variables.  A clear 
relationship is hardly observed among the four variables based on the results of the other eight 
barangays. 
Table 3.1. Evacuation intention and behavior in relation with community leaders at the barangay level. 













1&4	 71.7%	 86.8%	 16.0%	 24.5%	
2	 65.4%	 73.5%	 19.4%	 39.2%	
87	 30.8%	 38.8%	 26.3%	 76.9%	
89	 58.5%	 58.8%	 33.3%	 46.2%	
Palo	
San	Fernando	 44.3%	 60.4%	 31.3%	 32.8%	
Baras	 52.1%	 67.2%	 26.8%	 42.3%	
San	Joaqin	 67.1%	 79.7%	 25.5%	 55.6%	
Tanauan	
San	Roque	 56.0%	 71.8%	 35.3%	 69.3%	
Calogcog	 60.3%	 71.0%	 18.2%	 41.2%	
Santa	Cruz	 68.0%	 83.1%	 30.5%	 74.3%	
Average	 57.4%	 69.1%	 26.3%	 50.2%	
Note 1. The percentage represents the rate of answers of “Yes, I had a strong intention to evacuate to 
somewhere except my house.” 
Note 2. The percentage represents the rate of answers of “Some places except my house.” 
Note 3. The percentage represents the rate of answers of “Barangay leader told me to do evacuation.” 
Note 4. The percentage represents the rate of answers of “Very high” and “High” in the question “How much 
did you rely on Barangay leader in order to get disaster related information such as typhoon warning?”	
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3.3.2	Individual-basis	analysis  
The individual-basis analysis demonstrates limited relationships among the four variables. A chi-
square test revealed that “degree of trust on barangay captains in terms of disaster related information” 
does not have a statistical relationship with evacuation behavior and evacuation intention (see Figure 
3.1 below). However, when we specified the target of analysis and selected only the respondents who 
answered that “Barangay captains told me to do evacuation,” the degree of trust of barangay captains 
is higher and this result is statistically significant. Based on these findings, we consider that the degree 
of trust of barangay captains and evacuation behavior are not unconnected, but the perception of only 
those who trust barangay captains is connected to evacuation.  
 
Figure 3.1. Evacuation intention and behavior in relation with community leaders in individual-based analysis. 
3.4	Conclusion 
The barangay-level analysis shows that the relationship between evacuation and barangay captains is 
not clear. On the other hand, the individual analysis partially indicates that the higher degree of trust 
of barangay captains relates to evacuation. That results should be carefully interpreted because the 
barangay captain variables do not relate to evacuation behavior and intention if the analysis include 
all of the respondents. Thus, the analysis in this section suggests that barangay captains play 
important roles in evacuation, and at the same time their function cannot be said to be perfect.  
These findings are not fully but partially consistent with the earlier work of Kure et al. (2016a: 1156). 
Furthermore, the finding in this section complement arguments of Kure et al. (2016a: 1156) and Kure 
et al. (2016b: 1640008-24) that think much of strengthening the capacity of barangay captains. Taking 
into consideration the limited effectiveness of barangay captains, other measures should be seriously 
















χ2 (8, N=111) = 5.475, n.s.
χ2 (1, N=417) = 10.180, p<.01
χ2 (8, N=635) = 6.443, n.s.
χ2 (4, N=589) = 291.691, p<.01
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variables should be included in this preliminary study, and the combination and interaction of 
variables requires further exploration.  
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Super Typhoon Haiyan, which struck the Philippines on November 8th, 2013, devastated Tacloban 
City. Housing and schools suffered heavy damage, and the education system was severely disrupted. 
As families move through the multiple phases of temporary to permanent housing, children’s 
schooling may also be disrupted, as they move to different schools. For families’ life recovery, 
decisions about schools and housing are closely connected in their decision-making process. The 
importance of this linkage between housing and education in the post-disaster phase is also 
emphasized in the Sendai Framework of Disaster Risk Reduction, adopted at the 3rd U.N. World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015).  Based on a field visit to Tacloban in July 
2015, 20 months after Typhoon Haiyan, funded by the International Research Institute of Disaster 
Science (IDIReS), Tohoku University, this section shares preliminary findings about the current 
learning environment at schools and children’s access to education in relation to relocation of families 
affected by Typhoon Haiyan in Tacloban City.  
4.1	Damage	to	school	buildings		
After being hit by Typhoon Haiyan on November 8, 2013, schools in Tacloban City reopened on 
December 6, 2013, as a ‘soft opening’. At each school, damages among students were checked. 
Classes resumed on January 3, 2014 at the start of the new term.   
4.1.2	Temporary	classrooms	
Temporary classrooms were provided by donors for schools whose classrooms were damaged, such as 
San Jose ES, where most temporary classrooms will not be used after the construction of new 
classrooms is complete. Temporary classrooms provided by the Red Cross on the grounds on San Jose 
ES will be dismantled shortly.  
Figure 4.1 Damaged classroom (San 
Jose ES, July 2015) 
Figure 4.2 Temporary learning spaces and newly built classrooms 




As families moved several times to evacuation shelters, bunkhouses, transitional shelters, and 
permanent housing, children have also changed schools. From interviews with families in permanent 
housing settlements, parents made great efforts to keep children in school, even paying transportation 
costs by themselves.  Some charities/NGOs provide school buses to take children from relocation 
areas in northern Tacloban to former schools in central Tacloban. However, among different schools 
and families, knowledge about such transportation services varies.  
4.3	Schools	face	sudden	and	large	changes	in	enrollment	
At some schools near central Tacloban City, especially in or near Barangay 88/San Jose area such as 
Fisherman’s Village ES and San Jose ES, the number of pupils decreased sharply one year after 
Typhoon Haiyan. Conversely, at some schools near northern Tacloban relocation sites, such as at 
Lucio Vivero ES and Sto. Nino ES, the number of pupils greatly increased one year after Typhoon 
Haiyan and even larger increases were expected within 2015.  
Tacloban City Department of Education (DepEd) has supported affected schools by relocating 
teachers according to the changing number of pupils, and by provision of additional financial support 
to repair classrooms (30,000 pesos per classroom) and purchasing learning and teaching materials for 
typhoon affected schools.  
4.4	The	role	of	donors	in	school	construction	
In the Philippines the education system uses school-based management. So the responsibility for 
finding donor support for school repairs and reconstruction falls to heads of schools. The role of 
DepEd is raising attention of donors and related agencies to demands for new schools, circulating the 
number of expected students, providing specifications and standards of school buildings, and 
allocating teachers to new schools.  
Support from donors was extended to directly hit schools in coastal areas, such as Fisherman’s 
Village ES, where by the school head’s efforts, most repair work had been completed. However, due 
to the decrease in the number of pupils, some classrooms are not used.  On the other hand, Lucio 
Vivero ES in North Tacloban could not receive enough support from donors to match the rapid 
increase in the number of pupils and high demand for additional classrooms. Since the construction of 
new schools is planned within permanent housing settlements, increases in the number of pupils at 





The need for school buildings in new locations is more urgent that usual school construction. Since 
DepEd could not finance building new schools at this time, school land and buildings are provided 
through various support and coordination with support from local government and other agencies and 
donors involved in housing construction.  
The first permanent housing completed was built by the non-profit foundation supported by the 
Global Media Alliance (GMA) company, and also by Habitat for Humanity, on land owned by 
Tacloban City. There are already approximately 500 households living in these houses, and GMA will 
also support the construction of a school in the center of this settlement.  
A larger number of permanent housing units will be built by the National Housing Authority (NHA) 
in multiple developments; several are planned to be complete by the end of 2015.  School sites are 
included in central areas of five of these planned settlements: 1) Ridgeview, 2) Atlantic (Suhi) SDP, 
3) North Hill Arbour (1&2), 4) Greendale Residence 2&3, and 5) Guadalupe Heights 1&2.  
Tacloban City organizes a weekly coordination meeting called “Tacloban North Development  
Meeting” to identify, share and discuss issues raised in the course of reconstruction with the agencies 
involved. In July 2015, building new schools in relocation sites was an item on the agenda list, and 
Tacloban City DepEd is a member of the meeting along with Tacloban City Housing and Community 
Development, Planning Department, the Mayor’s office, Engineers, Architects, Health and Social 
Services. This meeting is an excellent example of multi-sectorial coordination needed to face the 
challenges of reconstruction holistically, including education as well as housing and infrastructure.  
4.6	Findings	and	suggestions	from	the	July	2015	survey	
• The need for urgent and rapid provision of schools and school buildings requires additional 
coordination than the regular provision of schools. Classroom construction/ expansion based on 
the actual number of students enrolled lags behinds actual needs.  
• Reliance on donors for building construction works well to repair damaged schools in the disaster 
area, but new schools or those with swelling enrollment in North Tacloban face difficulty in 
attracting the same support. 
• How to meet such temporary and sudden increase of pupils’ numbers in schools near relocation 
sites should be carefully examined, and support from DepEd and donors should consider how to 
support this situation. This is not an issue for only heads of schools to deal with, but requires 
coordination at a larger scale. 
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• Possible solutions could be: a) provision of temporary classrooms that are no longer in use at San 
Jose schools and other coastal schools; b) supporting transportation from permanent housing 
complexes to schools in coastal areas until new schools will be ready within the housing complex. 
4.7	Updates	from	the	second	field	visit	in	January	2016		
In the “Tacloban North Development Meeting” held on January 27, 2016, coordination of 
demolishing and transferring temporary learning facilities to the northern area and setting strategies 
for new school construction were major agenda items in the education sector.  Since there were no 
DepEd representative in attendance at the meeting, it was not clear how the coordination has been 
made to move the agenda forward. There is some progress to demolish and transfer temporary 
learning spaces (TLS) to a newly constructed permanent housing site, Ridgeview, as of January 2016. 
However, there were also calls that immediate action was required to avoid a school crisis in the 
relocation places. This is an example that requires coordination between housing and education 
sectors for build-back-better.  Access to children’s education opportunities should not be limited by 
the relocation of living places. Continuous follow-up is needed by carefully examining how the 
reconstruction process helps people feel they are able to build back better.    
Figure 4.3 Newly built classrooms (Lucio Vivero ES, 
January 2016) 
Figure 4.4 Demolished TLS materials in Ridgeview  
(January 2016) 
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Co-sponsored by IRIDeS and Tacloban City, the “Reflecting on Yolanda ~for saving future lives” 
Workshop was held on October 12, 2015 (Appendix 1). The aim of this workshop was to share the 
experience and lessons from Typhoon Haiyan to minimize losses from future disasters. Including 
participants from local municipalities including Tanauan Municipality, Palo Municipality, Tacloban 
City, the Philippines Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Department of 
Education (DepEd), the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services 
Administration (PAGASA), University of the Philippines, JICA and others, over 65 people were in 
attendance. After presentations from Tacloban City about the current situation of recovery, IRIDeS 
members shared research results from the Philippines and Tohoku, followed by discussion. 
6.	Disaster	Education	Training	and	Handbook	
Based on findings from the IRIDeS fact-finding missions in 2013-2014, the team produced typhoon 
disaster education materials that explain the science behind typhoons and safe evacuation practices, 
targeting elementary school students. Through cooperation with DepEd, this material was tested out 
in the classroom through guest lectures to 6th grade science classes at three elementary schools in 
Tacloban City in January 2016 (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1.  List of schools where guest lectures were conducted using the education material 





Fisherman’s Village Elementary 
School 















Manlurip Elementary School G6 Science class with 44 pupils from G4 to 
G6* 
* Due to heavy rain, there were not enough G6 students attending school. Therefore, 4th and 5th grade students 
also participated in the class.  
Though science classes at Philippines’ elementary school are taught in English, a Tagalog version of 
the material was also prepared for expected further dissemination to a wider audience, such as 
community people. Both English and Tagalog versions are available from the website of the 
International Collaborating Center of Disaster Education Research and Implementation (ICCDERI
at IRIDeS http://irides.tohoku.ac.jp/topics_disaster/haiyan-typhoon.html and is included in Appendix 
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Contact person: Dr. Shuichi Kure 
               kure@irides.tohoku.ac.jp 
               +81-(0)22-752-2114 
 
Reflecting on Typhoon Yolanda  
~for saving future lives ~ 
1st Workshop organized and sponsored by IRIDeS/Tacloban City 
Date: Monday, October 12, 2015 13:30-17:00 
Place: Don Joseph Pavilion, Leyte Park Resort Hotel 
 Super Typhoon Yolanda, making landfall on November 8, 2013, devastated the Eastern Visayas and 
part of the Central Visayas in the Philippines. This super typhoon of unprecedented magnitude 
generated a storm surge that caused catastrophic destruction of the coastal areas in Leyte and 
Samar. To prepare for saving lives against future typhoon events, this workshop aims to share 
important lessons learned from Typhoon Yolanda. The current recovery progress of Tacloban City 
will also be presented as part of discussions about building back better. 
Program 
 
13:30 Welcoming Address                Hon. Mayor Alfredo S. Romualdez (Mayor, Tacloban City) 
13:40 Keynote Speech                          Dr. Vicente B. Malano (Acting Administrator, PAGASA) 
14:10  “On-going recovery of Tacloban” 
 Development plan of the City                Ms. Atty. Jenny Lyn M. Polistico-Manibay (Tacloban City) 
 Housing progress and issues  Ms. Ma. Lourdes Lagman (Tacloban City Housing and Development Office) 
14:50  “Messages from the Barangays” 
15:15 Coffee Break  
15:30  “Learning from Typhoon Yolanda (IRIDeS’s findings) and some implications”  
  Preparation for future super typhoons                           Dr. Shuichi Kure (IRIDeS) 
 Future Challenges for Disaster Risk Reduction                        Dr. Yasuhito Jibiki (IRIDeS) 
 
15:55 “Experience to share from Japan” 
 Suggestions from APRU members and other stakeholders towards recovery process 
Dr. Takako Izumi (IRIDeS) 
Tide embankment project based on decision of local communities          Mr. Takuya Ito (IRIDeS) 
 Town-watching and mapping program for the disaster-affected schools and children 
Dr. Aiko Sakurai (IRIDeS) 
 Revitalizing local economy with planning                              Dr. Kanako Iuchi (IRIDeS) 
 Post disaster housing relocation: International comparison            Dr. Elizabeth Maly (IRIDeS)  
                                   












to Save Future Lives
International Research Institute of Disaster Science, 















A: Typhoon is a rotating, organized system of clouds and
thunderstorms that starts over tropical waters, and brings















































Storm surge is high tide and largewaves produced bystrong












































Can	we	predict	a	typhoon	coming? This was the warning where Yolandais coming, butpeople didn’tunderstand.
Track of Typhoon YOLANDA was predicted in advance, and weather agency
issued a warning, but people did not understand themessage
coastal	areas 	under	 s ignal	#3	and	 #2	are	alerted	 against	




















































Participate in evacuation drill




We can predict a typhoon coming
A Super Typhoon like Yolanda could come to
Tacloban again
Typhoon Yolanda caused big damages by storm
surge and strong wind
Importan t to discuss with you r family about




Some of figures used in this handbook was copied from
following materials:
• Min istry of Land, Infrast ructure and Transport and Tour ism Hokkaido Regiona l
Development Bureau, Japan
http://www.hkd.mlit.go.jp/zigyoka/z_jigyou/gijyutu/mizubousai.html
• Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and Tourism, Japan
http://www.mlit.go.jp/river/kaigan/main/kaigandukuri/forKids/INDEX0.htm
• Japan Meteorological Agency
http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/kishou/books/takashio/
• World Handbook on Local Disaster Management Exper iences for beginner s,
ICHARM, Japan
http://reliefwe b.int/s ites/reliefweb.int/fi les/re sources/ha ndbook_on_ local_ disa
ster_management_experiences.pdf
• PAGASARole of PAGASA inDisaster Risk Reduction and Management
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